Reactions to the Euro Summit Agreement for Greece

The Privatisation Fund

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A key requirement is to establish a larger privatisation programme:

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to develop a significantly scaled up privatisation programme with improved governance;

valuable Greek assets will be transferred to an independent fund that will monetize the assets through privatisations and other means. The monetization of the assets will be one source to make the scheduled repayment of the new loan of ESM and generate over the life of the new loan a targeted total of EUR 50bn of which EUR 25bn will be used for the repayment of recapitalization of banks and other assets and 50 % of every remaining euro (i.e. 50% of EUR 25bn) will be used for decreasing the debt to GDP ratio and the remaining 50 % will be used for investments.

 

This fund would be established in Greece and be managed by the Greek authorities under the supervision of the relevant European Institutions. In agreement with Institutions and building on best international practices, a legislative framework should be adopted to ensure transparent procedures and adequate asset sale pricing, according to OECD principles and standards on the management of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs);

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As there have been a number of comments on this in press, I’d like to affirm that:

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1. Greece already agreed to set up a € 50 billion privatisation programme in 2011. The Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (also known by its Greek acronym TAIPED) has since then only managed to close about € 3.5 billion in transactions.
    

2. Many if not most of the assets should be privatised, given the fact that they are either loss-making at present (and therefore their losses are paid for by Greek taxpayers), or produce zero value as they are idle assets. In many cases, certain assets are a key vector of political corruption via procurement contract kickbacks, or patronage via public sector hirings.
    

3. There are many ways to ensure that a privatisation ensures adequate profits for the state, and depends on how the competition and terms are structured. It is incorrect thinking to suggest that these assets will be sold “cheaply to foreigners”. So far, the privatisations that have occurred have Greek majority or minority shareholders, and only in one case is there a valuation issue.
    

4. The key issue is not so much the privatisation, as it is ensuring that the Greek state then agrees that investment plans can be licensed. I know of two privatisation transactions where the state did not respect the initial published terms of the privatisation, leading to a situation where although the winner was announced and key facilities were paid, development could not take place. (And I am not referring to SYRIZA’s cancellations or “idling” of all privatisations). Clearly, this is unacceptable as these destroy the image of Greece as an investment or business destination.
    

5. There are alternatives to privatisation, i.e. monetisation. One could imagine such alternatives to be bundling real assets as collateral against which capital could be raised, or private equity-style solutions. But privatisation is, in my opinion, the best option. These can be structured as long-term leases or straight sales with equity or EBITDA warrants or options for the Greek state to participate in performance upside.
    

The repayment objectives of the fund is also a net gain. Previously, all privatisation income was to be used for debt reduction. Now, income from privatisation will be used for:

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1. 50% of income (€ 25 billion) will be used to recapitalise Greek banks
    

2. 25% of income (€ 12.5 billion) will be used for public debt reduction
    

3. 25% of income (€ 12.5 billion) will be used for investments in Greece
    

This is therefore a benefit for Greece, compared to its prior commitment of 2011 which was never implemented.

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The fund will be based in Greece and managed by Greeks, under international supervision. This is probably necessary given TAIPED’s previous management experience. Again, everything depends on how this will be implemented.

 

Reforming the Greek Public Sector

 

The new Agreement includes the following commitment:

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in line with the Greek government ambitions, to modernise and significantly strengthen the Greek administration, and to put in place a programme, under the auspices of the European Commission, for capacity-building and de-politicizing the Greek administration. A first proposal should be provided by 20 July after discussions with the Institutions. The Greek government commits to reduce further the costs of the Greek administration, in line with a schedule agreed with the Institutions;

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Every government in Greece, including SYRIZA-ANEL, has promised to de-politicise and improve the Greek public sector. This is a very positive commitment, although also very unrealistic. Let’s see what will actually be implemented. So far, SYRIZA-ANEL has done exactly the opposite: it has sought to politicise every aspect of the Greek government, including by re-hiring 9,000 public sector workers which it manifestly cannot afford.

 

Re-establishing Troika Monitoring

 

SYRIZA promised to expel the Troika monitors and “tear up the Memorandum”. This led to an absurd situation where SYRIZA was actually meeting with monitors in Athens in hotel rooms, and disguising the events as conferences unrelated to government work. The new agreement re-establishes:

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to fully normalize working methods with the Institutions, including the necessary work on the ground in Athens, to improve programme implementation and monitoring. The government needs to consult and agree with the Institutions on all draft legislation in relevant areas with adequate time before submitting it for public consultation or to Parliament. The Euro Summit stresses again that implementation is key, and in that context welcomes the intention of the Greek authorities to request by 20 July support from the Institutions and Member States for technical assistance, and asks the European Commission to coordinate this support from Europe;

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This does open Greece up to very intrusive monitoring, particularly the sentence that I have underlined above. Unfortunately, this is a price to pay for how SYRIZA-ANEL have handled things, and regrettably is not much different from how things have been handled since 2012.  It is an abject surrender of national sovereignty. Sadly enough, it is difficult to see how things can function differently, given the record of the past 5 months, and the past 5 years.

 

Clawbacks on Past Legislation

 

SYRIZA-ANEL have passed a number of laws since February 2015 which must now be re-examined. It is difficult to see exactly how these will take place.

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With the exception of the humanitarian crisis bill, the Greek government will reexamine with a view to amending legislations that were introduced counter to the February 20 agreement by backtracking on previous programme commitments or identify clear compensatory equivalents for the vested rights that were subsequently created.

 

Debt Sustainability

 

The Agreement does make a specific mention of debt sustainability through reprofiling:

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There are serious concerns regarding the sustainability of Greek debt. This is due to the easing of policies during the last twelve months, which resulted in the recent deterioration in the domestic macroeconomic and financial environment. The Euro Summit recalls that the euro area Member States have, throughout the last few years, adopted a remarkable set of measures supporting Greece’s debt sustainability, which have smoothed Greece’s debt servicing path and reduced costs significantly.

 

Against this background, in the context of a possible future ESM programme, and in line with the spirit of the Eurogroup statement of November 2012, the Eurogroup stands ready to consider, if necessary, possible additional measures (possible longer grace and payment periods) aiming at ensuring that gross financing needs remain at a sustainable level. These measures will be conditional upon full implementation of the measures to be agreed in a possible new programme and will be considered after the first positive completion of a review.

 

The Euro Summit stresses that nominal haircuts on the debt cannot be undertaken.

 

Conclusions

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Media reports and politicians since Saturday have emphasised the dictatorial or non-democratic method in which the Agreement was reached. However, a closer look at the actual Agreement parameters in light of:

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• SYRIZA’s unrealistic domestic political promises that got it elected;

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• SYRIZA’s incoherent negotiating strategy which alienated every creditor and did nothing to support the Greek economy;

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• The consistent failure by successive Greek administrations to implement structural reform since this crisis started in late 2009; and

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• The very dismal reality of Greek public and private sector operations

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reveals that this Agreement is hardly the holocaust commentators have been claiming.

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Undoubtedly it re-introduces intrusive monitoring in which every Greek draft law affecting macroeconomic and fiscal operations must be approved. Undoubtedly it represents a loss of national sovereignty (much of which was already compromised by EU and ERM entry to begin with).

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And, as I have described in other articles, many of the specific measures are regressive and will not lead to the results hoped for: raising VAT, the shipping tax, etc.

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This is, however, the first document which re-confirms the importance of growth (via privatisations, which are undoubtedly controversial).

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But the commentators I have read fail to outline what the alternative may be. How else should official creditors who have already lent € 240 billion to Greece deal with a government that has branded them “terrorists” and “pillagers”?

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How else to deal with a government that has promised to “end austerity” and “tear up the Memorandum” while at the same time requesting new loans?

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As mentioned in many other posts: Greece has a fundamental choice. By joining the European Union and other multilateral organisations such as the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund, Greece voluntarily agreed to accept a series of rules-based, verifiable commitments.

 

It cannot both expect the gain the benefits of these organisations while simultaneously absolving itself of all responsibilities. This is a fool’s errand.

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That fundamental choice remains with Greece today. Accept this Agreement, which is far better than what I would have expected given the events of the past 5 months. Or quite simply continue to default, leave the Eurozone and accept the consequences of that.

 

Philip Ammerman

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